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 Containment beyond detention. The Hotspot System and disrupted migration move-
ments across Europe  
Martina Tazzioli (Swansea University) and Glenda Garelli (De Paul University) 
Introduction: Situating Containment   
Ventimiglia, Italian-French border, August 10, 2016. Four hundred migrants are forcefully removed 
from the hosting centre run by the Red Cross in Ventimiglia to the hotspot of Taranto , in southern 1
Italy. Other forced transfers to the Taranto hotspot took place from Como, the Italian city located at 
the border with Switzerland. Here, between summer and autumn 2016, migrants ended up being 
blocked due to the closure of the Swiss border and of push-back operations carried out by Swiss 
authorities .  2
Two years after the implementation of the EU “Hotspot System”, hotspots’ facilities partly changed 
their functions: envisioned as sites for regulating migrant arrivals by sea, hotspots have also become 
places for migrants’ redistribution on-land, i.e., places where migrants apprehended at the internal 
borders of Europe are temporarily transferred. Presented in the European Agenda on Migration as 
frontline infrastructures for incoming migrants’ identification through enhanced mechanisms of in-
tra-governmental control , Italian hotspots have also been used for redistributing migrants already 3
present on the national territory, and particularly for removing their unruly and contested presence 
from highly visible sites. So far this has happened in the aftermath of migrants’ protests and clashes 
with the local police in sites such as Ventimiglia, at the Italian-France border. These new evolutions 
complicate the territoriality and sovereignty of hotspots and call for an investigation of their actual-
ly existing geographies, beyond the EU governmental vision and the accounts of the governmental 
actors involved in their implementation and management.  
 Taranto is the only Italian hotspot located on the mainland, unlike  all other Italian and Greek hotspots 1
which are located on islands 
 According to ASGI, an Italian organisation of lawyers supporting migrants, about 7,000 migrants were 2
pushed back from Switzerland to Italy between April and July 2016.
 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-informa3 -
tion/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf
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In Greece, the hotspot-islands were used as “dock-and-go” sites during the first couple of months 
since their implementation. Migrants were registered relatively quickly and were subsequently let 
move on to the mainland. With the signing of the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016  and the almost 4
simultaneous closure of the Balkan corridor, Greek hotspots have become containment places for 
blocking migrants on the islands facing Turkey, hence preventing their arrival in Athens.  
This article engages hotspots as flexible chokepoints of mobility disruption and looks at the forms of 
containment and channels of mobility that the “hotspot approach” has generated. In other words, if 
hotspots serve a containment function as migrants’ temporary detention sites, here we are interested 
in mapping the geographies of mobility and immobility they enact through and beyond this func-
tion.  
By speaking of “containment beyond detention” we gesture towards an approach that situates 
hotspots within broader spatial economies of migration governmentality. Our goal is to move be-
yond an analytical focus on hot-spots as isolated units of border crossing. Second, “containment 
beyond detention” refers to a focus on containment practices beyond the premises of detention sites. 
In this regard, we build on Michel Foucault’s methodological displacement, which consists in 
“moving outside the institution […], putting the prison back in a general economy of power (Fou-
cault, 2007: 116-117). In other words, we look at the proliferation of containment strategies in the 
Hotspot System without superimposing a preconceived notion of carceral space to the detention 
mechanism. Presented as a surgical technology for enhanced border functions, hotspots are instead 
complex and flexible systems for managing migrants’ mobility to, through, and away from the Eu-
ropean space. By “containment” we refer to the effects of mobility disruption, spatial fixation and 
temporal suspension that are generated through measures of confinement that do not coincide with 
detention. Such practices aim to regain control over migrants’ autonomous geographies.  
The notion of “containment" remains partially under-theorised in migration scholarship. When it is 
employed it tends to be used as a synonymous of “confinement” and in opposition to 
“mobility” (Mountz, et al. 2013). On the contrary, we ague that containment is not only confine-
ment and that there is a need for exploring the nexus between containment and (institutionally 
forced) mobility. In other words, while containment can also consist in spatial confinement prac-
tices (as it is the case of migrants blocked in Libya and prevented from crossing the Mediterranean), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_it.htm 4
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it is not only blockage and immobility. Rather, governing migration through containment means 
troubling both migrants’ geographies and migrants’ presence For instance, as we will show in this 
paper, containment effects also derive from governmental practices that keep migrants on the move 
(Gill, 2009; Tazzioli, 2017), not just blocking them in a structure of detention.  Finally, the notion of 
containment allows avoiding the trap of the binary oppositions that underwrite migration theories, 
i.e., inclusion / exclusion, and mobility / immobility. Containment, in fact, is not only about keeping 
migrants out of a place per se  (out of Europe, out of national borders); nor is it only about their 
(adverse) incorporation into the labour market. Containment is about governing migration by dis-
rupting, decelerating and diverting migrants’ autonomous movements and by hampering migrants’ 
presence in certain spaces. While containment can take the form of spatial confinement and pro-
tracted strandedness, here we point to modes of containment enacted by keeping migrants on the 
move. Through this take on containment we map mobility control in its actually existing spatial 
processes, which go way beyond the governmental phantasy of seamless circuits and channels of 
mobility control. Far from being smoothly channelled through the asylum system, migrants are sub-
jected to modes of government that frantically try to regain control over their autonomous move-
ments: containment—the physical containment of certain movements, but also, and most important-
ly, the containment of migrants’ desire to settle in a particular place—is one of these strategies, as 
the article will show. 
Methodologically, the empirical focus of our research is positioned beyond the enclosed space of 
the hotspot and the bounded time migrants spend there. We instead direct our attention to the con-
trol and hosting spaces that are connected to the hotspots but branch beyond the hotspots’ perime-
ters—the Hotspot System’s impact beyond the space of the hotspot, “beyond the camp” (Garelli, 
Tazzioli, 2017). In other words, our goal is to follow what happens to some migrants beyond the 
spaces and times of hotspot detention, and hence to map the outcomes of the Hotspot System on 
migrants’ routes and lives.   
We conducted participatory observations and interviews with migrants both within the premises of 
hotspots , and in border-zones such as Ventimiglia and Como in Italy, where migrants went after 5
fleeing hotspots upon identification. We also kept in touch with a group of migrants who fled from 
 In principle migrants are not allowed to move in and out of the hotspot. On the islands of Lampe5 -
dusa, Chios and Lesbos, however, they tend to be allowed to stay out during the day, although arbi-
trary restrictions are often estabished.
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the Lampedusa hotspot after having been subjected to identification procedures by the use of force 
(e.g., forced fingerprinting) and reached the cities of Ventimiglia and Marseille. We also conducted 
semi-structured interviews with Frontex and Easo  officers—who are the representatives of the EU 6
inside the hotspots—and with the Italian and Greek authorities in charge of the implementation of 
the hotspot system and of complying with the EU standardised identification procedures . Finally, 7
we interviewed workers of NGOs and international organizations, ranging from Doctors without 
Borders (an actor who refused to work inside the EU hotspots) to the main actors of the Hotspot 
System like UNHCR and the Red Cross. Our choice to interview these different actors was rooted 
in the consideration that far from being the result of a shared and streamlined political strategy or 
the manifestation of a supposed effective Europeanization of migration controls, the Hotspot Sys-
tem is in fact the outcome of several frictions—between the EU on the one hand, and Greece and 
Italy on the other.  
In order to account for the outcomes of the hotspot approach on migrants’ journeys, we mobilize an 
analysis that is receptive to hotspots’ heterogeneous and flexible functions. Such analysis maps the 
spatial productivity associated with the EU hotspot approach beyond the policy discourse on securi-
tized crossing hot-spots. Instead, our study maps the spatial processes that hotspots ignite, from the 
repurposing of hotspots as ad hoc containment sites, to the proliferation of informal hotspot-like 
space, to the spatial expansion of detention practices.  
In the first section of the article we trace a genealogy of the use of the term “hotspot” suggesting 
that the multiplication of hotspots-like designated spaces is related to a governmental re-conceptual-
isation of the border as a site requiring prompt enforcement interventions. The article moves on by 
investigating the mechanisms of partitioning, identification and preventative illegalisation  that are 8
at stake in the hotspots of Lampedusa and Lesbos. Hotspots are not analysed as sites of detention 
per se: rather, we turn our attention to what we call “containment beyond detention” and to the ex-
  Since it is forbidden to access hotspots, our interviews with Frontex and Easo officers happened 6
at Easo headquarters in Athens and  at the Frontex office in the Italian city of Catania.
 We conducted our ethnographic research in Lampedusa (December 2015, February 2016), of Ven7 -
timiglia (August, 2015, August and December 2016) as far as Italy is concerned; and in Lesbos 
(April 2016, July 2016) and Chios (July 2016) in Greece. 
 “Preventive illegalization” indicates the labelling and production of some migrants as “illegal” 8
subjects, as they are also denied the possibility to claim asylum, and to eventually be recognized 
international protection. 
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clusionary humanitarian channels of the EU Relocation Scheme, which pertain to the Hotspot Sys-
tem functioning. We conclude analysing channels of forced mobility in light of the fight against 
“secondary movements” that is at the core of the current EU’s political agenda, and sketch a re-
search agenda for a genealogy of practices of migration containment. 
Our argument about hotspots as mechanisms for containment beyond detention critically engages 
with three bodies of literature: carceral geography, enforcement archipelagos, and migration logis-
tics. Geographers’ engagement with migrant detention importantly brought to the fore the nexus 
between disciplinary mechanisms and the spaces of control, by illuminating the “embodied inscrip-
tion of incarceration” (Moran, 2015), unpacking the economy and micro-economies of detention 
(Belcher, Martin, 2013; Conlon, Hiemstra, 2014), and illustrating the experienced temporality of 
imprisonment (Wahidin, 2002; Wahidin and Tate, 2005) and the spatialities of containment 
(Mountz, Loyd, 2014). This body of literature also radically unsettled the boundaries of the prison, 
investigating forms of containment that take place outside of the fences of detention centres while 
being strictly connected with them (see, for instance, migrants’ punitive forced transfers from one 
detention cente to another—Gill, 2016; Hiemstra, 2013). Some authors challenged the inside/out-
side opposition in relation to detention, looking at practices of incarceration that take place out of 
the prison (Moran et al, 2013), or considered the “intimate economies” (Conlon, Hiemstra, 2017) of 
detention. These are important analyses that refocus the analysis on the different circuits (of people, 
goods, and practices) that constitute the carceral space. In particular, recent contributions have 
turned attention to “the different forms that enforcement can take” and to the “transforming spaces 
of enforcement” (Burridge et al. 2017: 241).  
Yet, also when detention and detention sites are not taken as the starting point to analyse discipli-
nary mechanisms of containment and economies of illegality , containment is conceived in terms of 9
specific spatialities of physical confinement that proliferate beyond official detention centres. In this 
article we take detention geographers’ indication to move away from the infrastructure of reception 
centers one step further: we point to effects of containment that are partially disjoined from spaces 
of direct control and confinement and that consist, rather, into forced mobility induced by state 
policies, migrants temporarily stranded in border-zones, and in the disrupting and deceleration of 
 An exception to this approach to detention is Nick Gill & al’s research agenda that gestures to9 -
wards a “concept of carceral ‘circuitry’ as a way to give priority to the connections between, 
around, within and beyond carceral institutions” (Gill et al., 2016: 2).
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migrant geographies.  Moreover, we study hotspots from the angle of the government of mobility at 
large: how does the Hotspot System channel migration movements in relation to the broader econ-
omy of capturing, diverting and slowing down migrants’ mobility? Finally, we do not conflate 
hotspots with carceral spaces; instead, we investigate their spatial productivity. This approach 
proved particularly important to understand the functioning of the Lampedusa and Lesbos hotspot 
as chokepoints in which migrants are partitioned, identified and sometimes preventively excluded 
from the channels of asylum, and to specify the outcomes of migrants’ immobilization beyond the 
strict definition of incarceration. In this sense, the hotspot has been rightly defined as a “highly flex-
ible informal mechanism for governing diverse migrant population” (Painter et al., 2017). In other 
words, the hotspot responds less to a disciplinary and punitive rationale than to a “border 
tactic” (De Genova, 2017a) for temporarily disrupting and channelling mobility.  
The second body of literature this paper is in conversation with is that on island geographies. Alison 
Mountz talked about an “enforcement archipelago” pointing to the need of studying islands not as 
isolated exceptional spaces but as part of a strategy of migration management that detaches control 
from the mainland and “shrink[s] spaces of asylum” (Mountz, 2011: 126; see also Mountz, 2016; 
Steinberg, 2005).  Certainly, the location of hotspots on Italian and Greek islands speaks to this 
function and creates a “frontline archipelago” (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2016a) at the Mediterranean 
frontier of the EU, setting up border enforcement outposts in the central Mediterranean- and Aegean 
routes. Hotspots’ detachment form the mainland is in fact part and parcel of the logistics of manag-
ing arrivals and sorting profiles, the so-called “management of mixed flows” at “entry-points,” as 
the governmental language puts it Hotspots were in fact envisioned for containing migration away 
from the mainland (or from central places) as the literature on “enforcement archipelagos” allows 
us to see. Building on this analysis, our study also looks at their implementation focusing on 
hotspots’ outcomes on migrant flows on the mainland (despite their  stated mandate), and investi-
gating how hotspots interact with other border management technologies. In other words, we are 
interested in how the remoteness of hotspot-islands becomes imbricated with the structures of mi-
gration management on land. 
Finally our work contributes to the discussion about migration and logistics, focusing on the “logis-
tic spaces” (Cowen, 2014) that are generated by and connected with the government of mobility. 
The main idea behind this approach is that mechanisms for blocking and obstructing migration 
should be situated within the broader context of the politics of mobility, a politics that strives to 
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channel, control, and select movements (Biao, Lindquist, 2014; Mezzadra, 2016; Mezzadra, Neil-
son, 2013; Popescu, 2015). Our contribution to this conversation focuses on the nexus between lo-
gistics and migration containment. We argue that containment is one of the main effects produced 
by the chokepoints and channels that the infrastructure of migration management—in its hotspot 
approach—institutes, and that such logistics of containment is a governmental response for ob-
structing migrants’ autonomous movements and for taming and dividing migrant multiplicities. The 
infrastructure of containment we refer to is not only limited to a repressive strategy (e.g., mecha-
nisms for stopping and pushing-back  migrants), but refers also to various forms of 10
“entrapment” (legal, existential and spatial) that result from mobility control mechanisms like the 
hotspots. Thus, we engage with hotspots’ spatial productivity more than simply sign-posting them 
as markers of a repressive strategy.  
A Genealogy of Border-Hotspots 
“Hotspot” is not a new term in the EU lexicon, and in fact it did not appear for the first time in the 
European Migration Agenda of 2015. The word “hotspot” has long been used for designating dif-
ferent types of critical border sites, including zones targeted for security, military, and military-hu-
manitarian interventions.  Back in the early 2000s, in fact, the EU introduced the term “hotspots” in 
policy conversations addressing crime and natural disasters, long before its deployment in the field 
of migration. It this early use, European agencies like Europol, for instance, referred to “logistical 
hotspots” to indicate critical criminal sites that allowed “illicit” transfers of people and goods. In the 
field of migration, the nomenclature of smuggling hotspots was introduced in discourses about 
“illegal” migration and smuggling activities. For instance, the 2009 NATO Report on migration in 
the Mediterranean, Sicily and the Strait of Gibraltar talked about “hot spots for illegal migration”, 
referring both to unauthorized migrant crossings and smuggling centres . In this context hotspots 11
describe both the “hot” places of migrants’ and refugees’ entry into the EU, and the logistics of mi-
 The push-back operations performed by the Turkish coast guard under the EU-Turkey deal for 10
hampering migrants from reaching Greece are a case in point.
http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1858 11
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grants’ journeys, and smuggling sites inside and outside Europe. . Even some third-countries are 12
named smuggling hotspots—e.g., Egypt was recently labelled as the new smuggling hotspot by 
Frontex .  13
As part of this genealogy,, it is also important to trace the historical-political background of the 
Hotspot System, and to highlight its internal frictions  (between member states, the EU and Eu-
ropean agencies), as well as the the multiple political and legal paths that led to the implementation 
of Italian and Greek hotspots. Keeping both the discursive and historical-political background in 
mind, three areas emerge as relevant to the hotspot genealogy we trace here: hotspots should be 
studied in relation to migration smuggling hubs, hosting systems for asylum seekers, and member 
states’ disobedience against the EU identification standards. “Migration smuggling hubs” is the des-
ignation used by Frontex to indicate critical migrant routes that are object of governmental concern. 
In its 2012 Risk Analysis—so three years before the EU Agenda on Migration—Frontex talked 
about the Eastern Mediterranean route as “the undisputed hotspot for illegal entries to the EU” , 14
contributing to the securitarian approach to hotspots.  The Italian hosting system for asylum seekers 
represents the second important pillar in the genealogy of the Hotspot System. In particular, Italy’s 
restructuring of the reception system in 2014 constituted to some extent the material backbone for 
the implementation of the EU hotspot approach. In 2014 in fact Italy created new temporary recep-
tion centres called “CAS” (Centri di accoglienza straordinaria, Extraordinary Hosting Centres) to 
respond to migrants’ increasing arrivals by spreading hosting functions across the whole Italian ter-
ritory. This measure represented the humanitarian landscape against which hotspots infrastructures 
emerged: hotspots as a securitarian filter that would allow the access of some migrants to the Italian 
hosting system . The third important component of this brief historical-political background of the 15
Hotspot approach consists in the repeated frictions between Greece and Italy on the one hand, and 
 “Smuggling hotspots  are located along the main migrant routes and attract migrant smuggling 12
networks. These hotspots may be favourably located along routes where most migrants travel or 
may feature easy access to transport infrastructures used for illegal facilitation activities” (Migrant 
Smuggling in the EU, Europol Report, 2016)
 Fabrice Leggeri, the Director of Frontex, stated in an interview that “Egypt [is] now also begin13 -
ning to be a country of departure. Frontex sees there a new Hotspot”. (http://archyworldys.com/in-
terview-frontex-director-leggeri-sees-eu-asylum-policy-failed/) 
https://fullfact.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/general-press-pack-september-2015.pdf 14
http://www.meltingpot.org/IMG/pdf/circolare_gennaio_2014.pdf 15
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the European Union on the other, regarding migrant identification procedures. In 2015 Italy and 
Greece were admonished by the EU  for not having fingerprinted all incoming migrants between 16
2013 and 2014. The Hotspot System can be seen as the spatialization of the EU attempt to disci-
pline Italy and Greece to comply with the EU identification procedures and forcing the countries to 
share the collected fingerprints in the EURODAC  database. As Wendy Brown has eloquently cap17 -
tured, “through the hotspots, the Juncker Commission pushes back against assertions of nation-state 
prerogative with EU technocracy and biopolitics; its agencies regain EU control over immigration 
to Europe and control over the migrants themselves” (Brown, 2017: 3). Building on this genealogy 
of the EU implementation of flexible infrastructures called “hotspots”  on both a discursive level 
(the EU hotspot-lexicon that designates critical sites) and  within the field of migration governmen-
tality (the political ground and the “antecedents” that paved the way to the Hotspot System) we can 
now move to the analysis of the Lampedusa and Lesbos hotspots.  
Illegalization on the Spot in Lampedusa 
We start our journey across the hotspots’ landscape from Lampedusa island, the southernmost tip of 
Europe, the island-mark of the central Mediterranean route into Europe, and the first hotspot to be 
opened in September 2015 with the idea that it would work as a model for all others. The first year 
of the Lampedusa hotspot was a time of experimentation with the flexible structure and multiple 
mandates of the hotspot. The Lampedusa hotspot is located in a hollow in the central part of the is-
land on military premises. The Contrada Imbriacola facility that now hosts the hotspot has been 
serving several functions over the years—from first aid centre, to hosting centre, and now hotspot. 
How do migrants end up at the Lampedusa hotspot? When the hotspot opened migrants tended to 
land at Lampedusa as part of Operation Triton, the EU border enforcement operation led by Frontex 
that started in November 2014. Upon disembarkation in the small harbour of Lampedusa migrants 
are moved to the hotspot where the Italian police and Frontex officers perform those identification 
procedures that are the defining feature of hotspots as heightened mechanisms of border sur-
veillance and technologies for filtering mixed flows at entry. How does the hotspot mandate for the 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/12/10/news/migranti_eurostat_in_italia_91_prime_richi16 -
este_asilo-129161067/ 
 EURODAC is the EU fingerprint database established in 2003. It stores fingerprint data about 17
applicants for international protection; irregular border crossings and unauthorised entries; unautho-
rised stay of third-country nationals.  
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full identification of incoming migrants actually play out at Lampedusa? Which geography of mo-
bility does it create for migrants and refugees—which diversions and disruptions of their mobility 
does this mechanism perform? More than technologies to enhance security, identification proce-
dures perform a preventive illegalization and often result in forms of punitive entrapment for some 
migrants on the island.   
 
Let us first focus on preventive illegalization practices via screening procedures.  As part of the 
Lampedusa hotspot procedure at its outset, all incoming migrants received an Italian Home Office 
questionnaire bearing the question, “What is the reason for your being in Italy?” with four options 
to choose from: “poverty,” “family reunification,” “work,” or “other reasons.” Until March 2016 , 18
war and persecution were not explicitly listed options and had to fall under the rubric “other”—an 
odd bureaucratic choice for a form meant to discern refugees from economic migrants (Garelli and 
Tazzioli 2016a). Migrants, activists and hotspot workers we interviewed, report that police officials 
often filled in the document for migrants, ticking the box that would decide their destiny (either pro-
tected refugees versus destitute undocumented economic migrants) simply based on migrants’ coun-
try of birth, and only allowing Eritreans, Syrians, and Iraqis —those eligible for the EU Relocation 
Programme—to start the asylum procedure. All others, including large numbers of people coming 
from West African countries, were instead illegalized on the spot: they were excluded from protec-
tion mechanisms and classified as undocumented economic migrants.  
What happened to these illegalized people during the first months of operation of the Lampedusa 
hotspot? They were officially asked to leave the country within seven days through an expulsion 
order called “7 days decree” and asked to leave the national territory, implying that they should pay 
for their own removal. Thus the hotspot mechanism produced a large population of illegalized peo-
ple on the national territory, living in destitution in Italy or across Europe. Those whom the Lampe-
dusa hotspot did not classify as eligible for protection ended up remaining on the European territory 
as migrants, irregularised by the workings of the hotspot system itself. Here we see how the filter-
ing mechanism envisioned as part of the securitarian approach of the hotspot results in internal 
flows of undocumented migrants, staging an uncanny implementation of the securitarian mandate 
 The Home Office introduced the option “asylum” subsequently, due to the criticisms of Italian 18
NGOs and journalists.
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for full identification. Hence, the hotspot is not only a mechanism to prevent most people from ac-
cessing the asylum procedure; it is also an instrument that results in adverse incorporation processes 
on the national territory, invisibilizsing migrants’ presence. The few accepted as asylum seekers are 
either forced to claim asylum in a country where they don’t want to be (Italy or a third country not 
of their choice); those labelled as non eligible for international protection end up living destitute 
lives, as undocumented migrants in Italy or elsewhere in Europe. 
The Lampedusa hotspot has also been performing a sort of punitive entrapment of migrants on the 
island: indeed, refusing being fingerprinted for migrants would imply relinquishing the freedom to 
decide where to claim asylum in Europe . While this refusal jams the swift screening system of the 19
hotspot frontline  (Garelli and Tazzioli 2016b), the spatial outcome onto migrants’ lives is that those 
who refused to be fingerprinted ended up stuck on the island, trapped there for their non compliance 
with the hotspot regulations. For instance, a group of 250 migrants, mainly Eritreans, who arrived at 
Lampedusa on November 5 and December 4, 2015, refused to be fingerprinted and organized a 
protest on December 17 to claim their right to choose where to seek asylum in Europe. Migrants 
who resist fingerprinting procedures at the Lampedusa hotspot end up in a spatial trap: they don’t 
have access to the protection system and are indefinitely detained on Lampedusa, far away not only 
from their aspired-to refuge, but also from the mainland. Ten of the 250 migrants who refused to be 
fingerprinted, were still on Lampedusa after three months since their arrival, while the others were 
transported to Sicily, having finally given their fingerprints out of exhaustion or as a result of the 
use of force on the part of the police . Few months later, we met few of them in the French city of 20
Marseille, trying to reach Calais passing through Paris. 
Greece: From Space of Transit to Space of Containment 
The role of Lesbos Island radically changed since the inception of hotspot and during its first year 
of operation. Given its proximity to the Turkish coastline, Lesbos has been a landing place for peo-
 They would relinquish the freedom to decide where to claim asylum: either as they would be forced to 19
claim asylum in their country of first entry  (Italy) as per Dublin III regulations; or because they would be 
assigned to one of the Relocation Programme countries as decided by officials.
 A possible “recourse to the use of force” in ensuring migrants’ fingerprinting is indicated in the EU direc20 -
tive released on 15 December. Yet, as stressed by Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo of the Legal Clinic of Palermo, 
“recourse to the use of force in fingerprinting procedures has no legal ground.” 
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ple trying to cross the Mediterranean into Europe via the Aegean Sea.  This function persisted also 
during the first months of the hotspot, when migrants were processed at differential speeds depend-
ing on their nationalities and were generally let go to the Greek mainland. But the transit-point 
function of the Lesbos hotspot rapidly ceased and Lesbos became a hotspot-island with an explicit 
containment and border enforcement function. This transformation of the Lesbos hotspot into a 
mechanism of capture that directly affects migrants’ lives is one of the most visible outcomes of the 
EU-Turkey agreement, and of the EU effort to stop migrant movements across the Aegean sea. 
   
Let us first focus on the first months of operation. The Moria hotspot in Lesobs opened in October 
2015, and worked as a centre of first identification more than as a space of detention until March 
18, 2016, when the EU-Turkey deal was approved. During the Moria hotspot’s five months of oper-
ation, identification procedures were a preliminary step that would grant migrants a permit to legal-
ly reside in Greece for either six months (Syrian nationals only) or one-month (all other nationali-
ties). This permit would allow them to get a ferry ticket to Athens and hence move on with their 
journey to other European countries along the Balkan corridor. During this initial period migrants’ 
fingerprints taken inside the Moria hotspot were not transmitted to the Eurodac database. Yet, even 
in this initial stage, the hotspot system worked as a selective and flexible mechanism, staging, for 
instance, a specific treatment for the nationals of North African countries (e.g., Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco) starting from November 2015. Labelled as ‘North African migrants’ by Greek authorities, 
these people were in fact subjected to immediate detention. During the same time-period, Pakistani 
migrants were also excluded from the free ride to the mainland and from the channels of asylum by 
a political decision that dates back to the beginning of 2016  (Tazzioli, 2016b). Pakistani migrants 
usually refuse to claim asylum in Greece, aware of the likelihood of a rejection and aware that ask-
ing for international protection corresponds to a form of humanitarian containment: “the asylum 
application process, for them, was experienced as immediate detention” (Spathopoulou, 2016). 
However, due to the lack of detention capacities in Lesbos, most of them were not identified by the 
Greek police.  
During these first months a spatial hieararchy was established on Lesbos between those migrants 
UNHCR considered “vulnerable subjects” and all other migrants. The first group was sent to the 
Kara Tapé camp in Lesbos, forced to live in containers but having the possibility to exit the camp 
during the day. The second group was held in the Moria hotspot. During a visit to Kara Tapé camp 
in April 2016, Martina Tazzioli observed that most people hosted there (639 at that time) were Syri-
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an families. As we went back to visit the camp in July 2016 we observed a similar composition of 
Syrian families. Vulnerability and nationality cannot, in fact, be fully disentangled from one anoth-
er. It can be argued that the former is always inflected by the latter, and changes according to the 
geographical and political context.  
The transformation of Lesbos from a dock-and-go site to a space of differential containment is the 
outcome of two interventions of border politics restructuring that occurred in the span of just a few 
months, from November 2015 to March 2016. The first one is the trickle-down effect produced by 
the progressive border closure along the Balkan route, starting from North (Slovenia) and moving 
on southward (Macedonia). A first access restriction at the Greek-Macedonian border (Idomeni) 
was put into place on November 19, 2015, when Macedonian authorities established an exclusion-
ary criterion for accessing the country based on nationality: only migrants coming from Iraq, Syria 
and Afghanistan could enter Macedonia. The second intervention consists in the implementation of 
the EU-Turkey Deal signed on March 18th, 2016, and preceded by negotiations between the EU 
and Turkey at the end of February that were re-launched after several months of stalemate (when 
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, threatened to send migrants to Europe as “human 
bombs”).  
The transformation of Lesbos into a space of containment, we argue, should not be read through the 
lens of the prison-island or carceral site. Far from being sealed spaces or zones of total detention, 
the governmental spaces for identifying, containing and selecting migrants (including hotspots) are 
crisscrossed by multiple movements and formed by differential circuits and channels of mobility. 
The nationality-based principle for managing migrants’ presence on the island we mentioned above 
is a case in point. Moreover, some were allowed to leave the island relatively quickly; others re-
mained blocked there for months; and some migrants were forcefully removed and brought back to 
Turkey. The hotspot, in fact, is not a monolithic space simply established to enclose and stop mi-
grants’ mobility: it multiplies migration profiles and differentiates migrants’ juridical profiles. To 
put in a nutshell, hotspots are procedures for channelling mobility and dividing migrant multiplici-
ties, more than detaining an indistinct group of migrants in a detention facility. As Doctors Without 
Borders remarked in an interview, the effective partitioning function of the hotspot started when 
Lesbos ceased to be a space of semi-autonomous transit to the mainland: “soon after the opening of 
the hotspot, Lesbos functioned as a space of first landing and as a space of transit for almost all mi-
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grants, in a quite homogenous way. With the first restrictions made on a nationality basis—and in a 
more consistent way with the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement—Moria became a space 
where migrants started to be subjected to multiple divisions and bureaucratic steps” .  21
In this reorganization it was not only the temporality of control of the hotspot that was reshuffled 
(from relatively quick transits to a more prolonged and more indefinite block). Also the number of 
channels, steps and categories for regaining control over migrants’ mobility multiplied. The logis-
tics of the Hotspot System in Greece is sustained by the multiplication of temporal borders, as a se-
ries of deadlines and time lapses that ultimately function as measures for further restricting the ac-
cess to relocation procedures and to the asylum process .  22
Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, and later on also Pakistanis were targeted for arrest and were pre-
vented from leaving the island, even after they obtained the one-month temporary permit. Few peo-
ple were actually apprehended and the illegalization of Pakistani migrants was managed rather 
through a different type of twofold trap: the trap of asylum and a spatial trap. That is, those who de-
cided to go to the hotspot to be identified in order to be eligible to submit an asylum claim were 
immediately detained inside the facility. In this respect, the centre started to operate as a closed fa-
cility for Pakistanis only. Migrants from other nationalities were de facto trapped there due to the 
geographical boundaries of the island and the denial of the special permit needed to travel to Athens 
by ferry.  
From a space of transit, the Hellenic peninsula became a site of containment where migrants are 
partitioned and divided. Similarly, many transit zones in Greece— like, for instance,  the Terminal 1 
of Pireus port —were transformed into spaces of control, identification and indefinite wait for mi-
grants. The concomitance of these two routes’ closures—i.e., the Balkan corridor and the sea route 
from Turkey to Greece—produced a situation where relocation became the only possibility for mi-
grants to move away from Greece.  
The Lesbos hotspot and the changes that occurred after its opening had a considerable impact on the 
spatial economy of migrants’ arrivals. Yet, the redefinition of the geographies of migrant sea jour-
  Interview with the coordinator of Doctors without Borders, April 13, 2016, city of Mytilene, Lesbos.21
A series of deadlines and intervals determines and impacts on migrants’ geographies. Only migrants who 22
arrived before the EU-Turkey deal, i.e. before March 20, 2016, are eligible for relocation; Iraqi citizens could 
apply for relocation only until July 1, 2016; the pre-registration procedure for asylum seekers was conducted 
between May and the end of July 2016, and concerned only those migrants who arrived between January 1, 
2015 and March 20, 2016.
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neys to Lesbos cannot be entirely grasped if we narrow the focus to the Greek shores only. The spa-
tial economies connected to the hotspot should be analysed together with the strategies of mobility 
containment put into place as a result of the EU-Turkey Deal and that enacted primarily by the 
Turkish Coast Guard. The number of migrant arrivals in Lesbos dropped from 1,400 to 70 per day 
in the span of few weeks, between the end of March and early April 2016. In turn, this produced 
transformations in the geographies and economy of migrant crossing. Due to the constant patrolling 
of the Turkish Coast Guard, migrants tended to arrive in the Southern part of the island, and no 
longer in the Northern one, that, while closer to the Turkish shore, was more heavily controlled. 
Simultaneously, because of increased likelihood of push-backs before migrants would reach Greece, 
smugglers changed approach. As a volunteer of the Spanish rescue organization Proactiva told us, 
“smugglers in Turkey now sell a sort of three-attempts tickets for $1000. This can be used three 
time by the same person to try to reach Lesbos, as a response to the increased possibility to be inter-
cepted at sea and returned to Turkey” . 23
From Hotspots to Channels  
Conceived as a site of mobility disruption, the hotspot represents a complex set of infrastructures, 
identification procedures, logistical nodes for managing migrants’ landing and regaining control 
over migration movements. Up to now, we have shown how the Hotspot System impacts on migrant 
lives and geographies, producing a population of illegalized migrants on the territory, multiplying 
migration profiles through the implementation of temporal borders and generating effects of spatial 
confinement. Yet, as explained in the Introduction, the modes of containment produced by the Hot-
spot System are not limited to physical entrapment on the islands; rather, they also entail forcing 
migrants to undertake convoluted geographies. These are the deferred containment effects per-
formed by the Hotspot System. They take place and become visible in sites that are spatially dislo-
cated from hotspot infrastructures. Simultaneously, the channels of the Relocation Scheme depart 
from the hotspots. Thus, the hotspot's bottleneck function should be seen not as a blind alley but as 
an exclusionary filter for slowing down access to institutional channels of departure.  
The Relocation Scheme was launched in simultaneity with the Hotspot Approach in the European 
Migration Agenda. It was in fact conceived as a EU programme for transferring “persons who are in 
 Interview with Pro Active volunteer, July 20, 2016, Monteolivo, Lesbos. 23
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need of international protection”  from Greece and Italy to other member states, hence in direct 24
connection with the hotspot filtering mechanism. However, the “need of protection” clause is not 
the only condition for entering the channels of the Relocation Scheme: the condition of being “at 
risk” is in fact fundamentally inflected by the nationality criterion. That is, only migrants whose na-
tionalities register a recognition of their international protection claim above 75% (as part of EU 
countries’ processing procedures) are eligible for Relocation .  25
Channels are usually associated with transportation (of goods and people) and mobility, as well as 
with the logistics that moves commodities from one place to another. Embracing this terminology to 
explain the hotspot approach means calling attention to the spatialities that grow out of migration 
governmentality—i.e., the material logistics and the legal procedures through which states attempt 
to regain control over migration movements (Tsing, 2000, Neilson, Rossiter, 2010). As Sandro 
Mezzadra has convincingly argued, the “channelling and distribution of migrants through the inter-
vention of both human actors and logistical infrastructures are crucial aspects of the process and 
dynamics of contemporary migration” (Mezzadra, 2016: 38).  This is the perspective we engage 
with in this paper, as we study the logistical infrastructure that is in place inside and “around” the 
hotspot (from the moment when migrants land on hotspot-islands to the selective transfer to hosting 
centers), together with relocation channels instituted by the EU as the hotspot’s twin policy. How-
ever, our focus on the channels of migration management is not meant to project the image of 
smooth spaces of migration control. Nor do we argue that these channels—established on a national 
level or as part of the EU political agenda—are actually working. On the contrary, our take on mi-
gration channels is connected to and built upon an analysis of containment effects: it is around such 
a nexus between channelling and containing mobility that our perspective develops. By speaking of 
“channels” our goal is also to point to an overlooked aspect in analyses about the logistics of trade 
and human mobility. Channels do not only haul mobility; they do not simply allow mobility to hap-
pen in a material sense. Channels also steer and contain movements. Channels contain and deceler-
ate flows; they do not simply serve as the material infrastructure of circulation. More importantly, 
while the channels of trade circulation are devised for regulating and making efficient the circula-
tion of goods, the institutional channels of migration mobility have been put into place for regaining 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-24
migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relocation_system_en.pdf 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-25
migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relocation_system_en.pdf
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control over migrant autonomous movements, producing blockages and introducing exclusionary 
partitions. Migration “cannot be stopped, only routed”, Wendy Brown succinctly puts it, as it is 
glaring from the “intricate ad hoc network of spatial and governing technologies for diverting, channelling, 
policing, and governing migrant flows” (Brown, 2017: 3). Thus, we suggest that future research should 
further explore the mutual relationships between modes of containment, as techniques of mobility 
disruption, and the channels of migration governmenality, as ways for regaining control over unruly 
mobility and introducing exclusionary criteria of access. 
Indeed, the channelling function of hotspots aim to decrease the intensity—quantitatively in terms 
of sheer numbers or qualitatively in terms of unruliness—of migrants and refugees’ mobility (to and 
across Europe). The Dublin Regulation and the Relocation Programme stages forced stops (country 
of first entry) and forced mobility (relocation destination). Hotspots are sites where the first selec-
tion between those who are eligible for relocation and others is made. Thus, while the system actu-
ally strengthened the role of Greece and Italy as the buffer zones for the European core, it was offi-
cially presented as a mechanism for sharing the “burden" of the refugees across Europe—i.e, mov-
ing them around in a regulated and legal way from the places of first arrival to other member states. 
In reality, the slowness of the Relocation process and the reluctance on the part of many EU coun-
tries to take asylum seekers from Italy and Greece, together with the closure of the Balkan corridor 
and the suspension of Schengen in six member states , have amplified the role of Greece and Italy 26
as frontier spaces of containment, outposts where migrants’ are blocked at the Mediterranean front-
line and circulation across the European space is contained (Kasparek, 2016).  
It is important to mention that many migrants who were considered eligible for the Relocation pro-
cedure finally refused it . What the EU promoted as a safe route towards Northern European coun27 -
tries, actually resulted in the impossibility for migrants to choose where to claim asylum. In other 
words, the “safety” of the (exclusionary) channels of relocation represented a material obstruction 
to migrants’ right to choice.  Hence “protection” started to appear as a synonymous of capture for 
some migrants, i.e., in their being moved and channelled by state policies. At the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) Headquarters in Athens officers confirmed that, indeed, “when the reloca-
 Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. 26
 The number of migrants who refused to apply for the relocation scheme is not available. These refusals are 27
not officially counted by UNHCR or national authorities. Yet, through the interviews that we conducted with 
local institutions, with Easo officers and with migrants in Lampedusa and in Lesbos, migrants’ refusal was a 
quite common practice during the first year of the implementation of the hotspots. 
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tion started, it was presented to migrants as a way to continue their journey safely; yet, the majority 
preferred to do that in an autonomous way. Only after realizing that they were stranded in Greece 
with no alternatives, Syrians opted in mass for relocation” . 28
  
The EU “fear” of migrants’ secondary movements should be read in light of the Hotspot System 
and of the effects of containment that it generated. “Secondary movements” is the expression used 
by the EU to designate migrants’ autonomous movements outside established governmental chan-
nels and against the forced geographies of Dublin Regulations . The consequence of the obligation 29
for Italy and Greece to fingerprint (enforced through the presence of Frontex officers inside the 
hotspots) was that migrants ended up trapped in these countries, if not physically at least legally, 
due to the implication of the Dublin Regulation . At the same time, the slowness and the exclu30 -
sionary character of the relocation procedure together with migrants’ will to choose the country 
where to claim asylum, compelled many migrants to decide to move on towards Northern Europe in 
an autonomous way. Thus, the confinement to Southern Mediterranean countries of entry produced 
by Dublin Regulations was not mitigated by the implementation of the Hotspot System. Rather, it 
was enhanced, due to the tightening of identification procedures and the forced “disciplining” of 
Italy and Greece in sending the fingerprints to Eurodac database. The domino effect of EU internal 
borders’ closures and the crisis of the EU space of free circulation with the suspension of Schengen 
in six countries further exacerbated the obstruction of relocation channels: not only migrants are 
subjected to the geographical restrictions of Dublin in their possibility to claim asylum; their mobil-
ity inside the European space has become the target of the EU’s struggle over “secondary move-
ments”. 
In order to show how the Hotspot System disciplines migrants’ unruly geographies, by producing 
effects of containment beyond detention—the perspective we introduced in the first part of the pa-
per—we conclude on the multiplication of hotspot-like spaces and on the forced internal transfers 
from Northern Italy back to the hotspots.  Since France’s suspension of Schengen in May 2015, the 
 Interview with Easo officers at Easo Greek Headquarters in Athens - July 22, 2016. 28
According to the Asylum and Migration Glossary, “in the EU context, secondary movement refers more 29
specifically to those movements of an asylum applicant from one Member State to another which is caused 
purely by di preferences in reception conditions or in the applicable legal frameworks” (p.15).
 Even those who managed to escape could claim asylum only in the state where they had been fingerprint30 -
ed at entry. 
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Italian city of Ventimiglia has become an unofficial chokepoint for migrants heading to France and 
the the UK. Ventimiglia is the closest Italian city to the French border, and together with Calais it is 
one of the main border-zones that mark and slow down the way to the UK for migrants arrived in 
Italy. It is not by chance, in fact, that the Prefect of the Department of Civil Liberties and Immigra-
tion of the Italian Home Office cautioned against the possibility of reproducing “Calais in Ven-
timiglia” . Ministry of the Interior Morcone put it even more crudely when he described Italian au31 -
thorities’ interventions at Ventimiglia as aimed at “lightening the frontier up,” and redistributing 
people across the territory to avoid organized concentrations of migrants. Yet, unlike Calais, which 
has become primarily a site of indefinite strandedness and wait, Ventimiglia can be considered a 
space of transit—not in a linear South to North sense, but as a space where migrants’ geographies 
become fragmented and where forced inverse routes take place. The emergence of Ventimiglia as a 
critical migration border-zone should be traced back to 2011, when France firstly suspended Schen-
gen due to the sudden increase of Tunisian migrants who landed in Italy soon after the outbreak of 
the Tunisian revolution. 
Rail station of Ventimiglia, July 2016. Migrants arrive in Ventimiglia, at the French-Italian border, 
daily. They come Milan, from Rome, or other Italian cities. In the city of Ventimiglia they can either 
go to the “temporary hosting centre” run by the Italian Red Cross, where will be able to stay only 
one week and will be identified (although not fingerprinted); or, they can opt to remain in the street, 
a choice often motivated by fears that the temporary hosting system could turn out to be a “humani-
tarian trap”.  Even if there is not an official hotspot, nor a detention centre there, the urban space of 
Ventimiglia has been working as a hotspot-like place, although with important differences with re-
spect to hotspots in Southern Italy. For instance, Frontex and Easo officers are not there: identifica-
tions, preventive illegalization and racialized partitions are made by the Italian police. Migrants 
who refuse to go to temporary hosting centres are subjected to police identification procedures. Ac-
tually, the fact of being “hosted” in the temporary hosting centre is not a guarantee of not being ap-
prehended in the streets. Most of the time, the partition between those who are tolerated on the terri-
tory and those who are transferred to detention centers or deported is made on the basis of the na-
tionality: migrants from “North African” countries are left outside the hosting centre, and in a way 
they are excluded from the channels of the asylum.  
 Prefetto Morcone’s speech to the Italian Parliament, July 19, 2016.31
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Migrants’ forced transfers by bus from Ventimiglia to the hotspot of Taranto (a city located in the 
Italian southern region of Puglia and 1,200 km away) became a kind of weekly routine starting from 
July 2016. Actually, these forced internal transfers do not always result into linear North-to-South 
patterns: as a Parliamentary Report shows, the forty-eight Sudanese migrants deported to Sudan on 
August 24, 2016, were transferred to the hotspot of Taranto (August 21) after being apprehended in 
Ventimiglia (August 19). From Taranto they were taken by bus to the airport of Turin, therefore 
back to Northern Italy, where they were put on a plane and repatriated to Karthoum . 32
Forced transfers to Southern Italy, however, are not permanent moves back, On the contrary, mi-
grants usually “show up” again in Ventimiglia after few days, after escaping the hotspot and return-
ing to the French-Italian border by train. Thus, more than detaining them in Southern Italy, Italy’s 
measures ended up protracting migrants’ journeys and forcing them to restart their route to France. 
In fact, one of the “hotspot effects” consists precisely in disrupting the autonomy of migration 
movements. The same forced counter-route from Northern Italy to the hotspot of Taranto has been 
used by the Italian police for removing migrants from the Swiss-Italian border, more precisely from 
the city of Como, and from Milan ; in some cases this happened also to migrants who had already 33
claimed asylum, preventing their being brought to a detention center or to a hotspot .  Como has 34
become a critical border-zone quite recently, in summer 2015, when Switzerland enforced border 
controls and  push-back operations. Milan is one of the cities, together with Bologna, that started to 
function as a hotspot-like space: at the Police Headquarters (Questura) of Milan, migrants’ national-
ity is the criterion for deciding who is allowed to claim asylum and who is illegalized on the spot, 
with a decree of expulsion, in a similar way to what happens inside the hotspot of Lampedusa (Sci-
urba, 2016).  
Looking at the Hotspot System through migrants’ scattered spatialities and governmentally mandat-
ed mobility channels, enables grasping two simultaneous spatial transformations. On the one hand, 
hotspot-like spaces spread across the territory (Ventimiglia, Como, Milan), not as multiplication of 
carceral spaces, but rather as chokepoints and sites of mobility disruption. This relates to effects of 
http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Resaula&leg=17&id=00988711&part=doc_dc-32
allegatob_ab-sezionetit_icrdrs-atto_406333&parse=no&stampa=si&toc=no
http://corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it/bari/cronaca/16_ottobre_25/migranti-scandalo-rifugiati-deportati-33
milano-taranto-a43270b4-9acc-11e6-807d-48fd84084516.shtml 
http://www.meltingpot.org/Rifugiati-deportati-trattenuti-e-umiliati-Una-storia-di.html#.WBxzQzYmVFK 34
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containment beyond detention, that often do not generate immobility but, rather, forces migrants to 
move away or to undertake convoluted geographies. On the other hand, a series of channels of 
forced mobility opened up, in connection with the hotspot, in order to move migrants back and 
refugees around, as ways for obstructing and regaining control over autonomous migrant erratic ge-
ographies.  
By speaking of EU’s fight against migrant secondary movements what we do not want to suggest 
that the EU is stopping unruly mobility, keeping migration movements across Europe to the mini-
mum. Rather, our argument is that migrants are kept on the move and are forced to undertake more 
and more erratic and diverted journeys, as a result of the many internal transfers they are targeted 
for. Moving migrants back and moving refugees around appear to be the two main modalities 
through which the EU is coping with migration movements which partly dodge or remain out of the 
institutional channels, like the Relocation Scheme.  
As scholars working on the EU internal borders and on the effects of the Dublin Regulation have 
demonstrated, migrant unruly geographies are not governed by stopping migrants but through their 
own mobility, that is to say by keeping them in transit (Fontanari, 2016; Hess, 2012; Schuster, 
2005). Yet, our point consists less in bringing attention to the hypermobility of migrants produced 
by tactics for disciplining and taming secondary movements than in showing the effects of con-
tainment generated by moving migrants back and around. The internal deportations that took place 
in Italy (from the border with France and with Switzerland back to the Italian hotspots) show that a 
state of incessant mobility and transit is enforced as a migration management strategy. This forces 
migrants to figure out how to partially restart their journey and generates their temporary contain-
ment.  
Conclusion 
The Hotspot System can be analysed from the point of view of its institutional function, i.e., as an 
enclosed site for temporarily detaining migrants while they are identified, labelled and partitioned 
upon landing. Based on ethnographic engagement in the Italian and Greek hotspots, this article has 
scrutinized the exclusionary criteria and the governmental practices through which migrants are 
managed and divided through the hotspot system. Instead of entirely focusing the analysis on the 
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institutional spaces of migration governmentality defined by states, we have moved beyond the 
fences of the hotspot and mapped the forms of containment beyond detention that are connected to 
the establishment of the EU hotspot approach to the migration crisis. We have investigated the 
mechanisms of preventative illegalization of migrants and the heterogeneous channels of mobility 
(the institutional channels of relocation and the channels of internal forced transfers) that are con-
nected to and enforced by the Hotspot System. Conceived as sites of mobility disruption, hotspots 
are flexible chokepoints that are actually used both for regulating migrant arrivals and slowing 
down their mobility, as well as for regaining control over migrants’ secondary movements. In clos-
ing this paper, we would like to sketch the trajectory of a theoretical engagement with the notion of 
“containment,” a trajectory that—as we have enacted it in this paper—consists in tracing the ge-
nealogy of heterogeneous forms and practices of containment that are linked to the hotspot ap-
proach.  
Nicholas De Genova has convincingly pointed out that “detention, like deportation, is a term that 
has no distinguished pedigree in the history of political ideas and legal concepts” (De Genova, 
2017: 6) . Building on this indication, we suggest that “containment”—like deportation and deten35 -
tion—remains a fundamentally under theorized and blurred notion in migration literature as well as 
in political theory. De Genova importantly points to the “economy of detainability” and the “econ-
omy of deportability” of migration (De Genova, 2017b: 1) as areas where more theoretical engage-
ment is needed. Looking at the spatialities triggered by and connected to the hotspot approach way 
beyond the fences of detention centres, we have sketched the economy of containment that charac-
terizes this approach. While carceral geography scholarship has persuasively drawn attention to the 
transformations of the spaces of confinement, shifting in part away from an exclusionary focus on 
detention centres, we call for a research agenda that  focuses on the economy of containment, grasp-
ing this latter beyond forms of direct control and physical entrapment. This involves, we suggest, 
remapping the European geographies of migration governmentally by looking at the institutional 
channels and chockepoints established for regaining control over autonomous migration move-
ments. Yet, far from fostering mobility and producing frictionless logistic spaces, the proliferation 
“In striking contrast with citizenship, for instance, which derives from a hallowed history of 35
philosophical debate and political practice concerned with the proper relationship of individuals to 
the public life of a larger community — and again, very much like deportation — detention has no 
such exalted genealogy” (De Genova, 2017: 6). 
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of hotspots-like sites and of selective channels of protection shore up a whole economy of contain-
ment that produce both temporary strandedness and forced convoluted mobility.  
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